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When parties enter into an agreement1 to engage in illegal transactions,2 and 
bring their dispute to a U.S. court,3 they put the court in the proverbial position 
between a rock and a hard place.  Enforcing the agreement is universally 
                                                 
 1. Courts and authors have often referred to these types of agreements as “illegal contracts,” 
but as Professor Corbin pointed out, an illegal contract is a “self-contradictory” term. ARTHUR 
LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1373, at 1 (1962).  The word “contract” suggests legal 
enforceability.  Therefore, if an agreement is illegal, it will not amount to a “contract” in the legal 
sense.  This article follows Professor Corbin’s preference and uses the words “agreement,” 
“promise,” or “bargain” to avoid conceptual confusion.  See id. 
 2. This article’s reference to illegal transactions includes both transactions that violate an 
explicit statute or regulation and those that are declared illegal and unenforceable due to violation 
of a more general notion of public policy as ascertained by the courts.  See id. § 1374, at 5‒6.  Some 
authors use the phrase “contracts against public policy” to describe all agreements that are declared 
unenforceable.  See, e.g., David Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public 
Policy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 563‒64 (2012).  Professor Williston uses the terms “illegal 
bargain” or “illegal agreement.”  5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 12:1, at 695 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2009).  To avoid confusion with the broader public 
policy doctrine applied in non-contractual context, this article uses the phrase “illegal agreements” 
or “illegal transactions” to cover all agreements that are illegal because they violate either explicit 
legislation or a particular public policy not explicitly articulated by the legislature. 
 3. This article focuses on the issue of illegality related to transactions between private 
individuals.  It does not address any issues related to the broader public policy doctrine in non-
contractual contexts.  For an article discussing policy regarding tax or federal spending issues, see 
Johnny Rex Buckles, Reforming the Public Policy Doctrine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 397, 397‒99 
(2005). 
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considered a bad idea.4  It is antithetical to the courts’ role to uphold the law,5 
and it undermines the legitimacy and dignity of the law.6  Thus, the non-
enforcement rule is deemed necessary to deter illegal agreements.7 
Non-enforcement, however, presents its own unique problems.  Refusal to 
enforce a bargain struck by two private parties offends the fundamental 
principles of freedom of contract and party autonomy.8  It also undermines 
contract law’s goal of maintaining certainty of contracts.9  Worse yet, non-
enforcement may run afoul of sound public policy by inadvertently creating 
incentives to enter into additional illegal agreements and engage in more illegal 
activities when non-enforcement allows a party to retain a windfall, undermining 
the very purpose for the non-enforcement rule.10 
Such illegal agreement disputes place U.S. courts in the crossfire of multiple 
conflicting interests that go to the essence of the kind of a society we have or 
                                                 
 4. See Bank of United States v. Owens, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 527, 538‒39 (1829) (stating that “no 
court of justice can in its nature be made the handmaid of iniquity.  Courts are instituted to carry 
into effect the laws of a country, how can they then become auxiliary to the consummation of 
violations of law?”). 
 5. See Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 412 (1889); Harry G. Prince, Public 
Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements: Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 
163, 165‒66 (1985). 
 6. See Robert A. Prentice, Of Tort Reform and Millionaire Muggers: Should an Obscure 
Equitable Doctrine Be Revived to Dent the Litigation Crisis?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 53, 106 
(1995). 
 7. McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669‒70 (1899) (commenting that “[t]o refuse to 
grant either party to an illegal contract judicial aid for the enforcement of his alleged rights under 
it tends strongly towards reducing the number of such transactions to a minimum”). 
 8. See Note: Validity of Contracts Which Violate Regulatory Statutes, 50 YALE L. J. 1108, 
1108 (1941) [hereinafter Yale Note] (acknowledging that the non-enforcement rule “conflict[s] 
with the more basic policy of preserving the inviolability of contracts”); see also Eldridge v. 
Johnston, 245 P.2d 239, 251 (1952) (noting that “public policy requires that men of full age and 
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when 
entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice, 
and it is only when some other over-powering rule of public policy . . . intervenes, rendering such 
agreement illegal, that it will not be enforced”). 
 9. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern 
Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 116‒17 (1988); Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: 
New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1496 (2010) (noting that “the breadth 
of the public policy doctrine impairs the certainty and predictability of contractual enforcement in 
California relative to that which obtains in New York”); see Prince, supra note 5, at 166. 
 10. Armstrong v. Toler, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 258, 260 (1826) (suggesting that an expansion 
of the non-enforcement rule “would lead to the most inconvenient consequences; carried out to 
such an extent, it would deserve to be entitled a rule to encourage and protect fraud”); M.P. 
Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L. J. 267, 284 (1966) (noting that “[i]t 
is notorious that the effect of declaring a contract illegal is often to confer an undeserved reward on 
one party”); John W. Wade, Benefits Obtained Under Illegal Transactions, 25 TEX. L. REV. 31, 55 
(1946) (pointing out that “[t]o a defrauder, the knowledge that the law will permit him to keep ill-
gotten gains will be an incentive to induce another to participate in an illegal contract”). 
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would like to have.11  These disputes implicate issues related to the proper scope 
of government regulation of private market behavior and the limits of private 
individuals to manage their own affairs.12  It forces a court to confront its own 
role in a system based on separation of powers.13  Understandably, courts 
struggle to balance these multiple competing interests.14 
The resulting body of case law, sometimes referred as the doctrine of illegality 
or void for public policy doctrine, has been described as “a mess,”15 a “rather 
                                                 
 11. See G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 431, 
446 (1993).  In deciding whether a plaintiff could recover money paid under an illegal agreement, 
one court described the dilemma faced by courts, noting: 
The courts have struggled with conflicting considerations of policy for hundreds of years 
in situations akin to the one here now. On the one hand, the courts are bent upon 
discouraging fraud and deceit by permitting such a recovery against defendants as this to 
the plaintiff here; on the other hand, if in the process of being defrauded, the plaintiff was 
knowingly participating in an illegal scheme, the courts have sometimes denied recovery 
to the plaintiff in order to discourage the illegality involved even though the fraud of 
defendants would remain unremedied. 
Fellner v. Marino, 158 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26‒27 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956). 
 12. F. H. Buckley, Perfectionism, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 133, 139 (2005) (noting that the 
doctrine of illegality sits at the border between public and private ordering); Shell, supra note 11, 
at 437‒38.  This Article does not intend to join the debate about whether contracts are public or 
private. 
 13. See, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting all legislative powers in Congress); U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § 1 (vesting the judicial power in one supreme court). 
 14. This balancing approach is reflected in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
178 (1981) which states as follows: 
(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy 
if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly 
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such 
terms. 
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account is taken of 
(a) the parties’ justified expectations, 
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and 
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term. 
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, account is taken of 
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial decisions, 
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy, 
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it was 
deliberate, and 
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the term. 
 15. Peter Birks, Recovering Value Transferred Under an Illegal Contract, 1 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 155, 156 (2000).  According to Professor Birks, this confusing state of affairs does 
not seem to be unique to the U.S. courts.  Id. at 156‒57.  He described the English approach as 
“riddled with contradictions and evasions.”  Id. at 158. 
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confusing,”16 or “vast . . . mysterious area of the law.”17  Legal scholars, noting 
the courts’ handling of illegal agreements lacks a comprehensive philosophy or 
analytical framework,18 have been searching for a coherent theory to explain or 
streamline the courts’ treatment of such agreements.19  One author proposes to 
explain the doctrine of illegality with a unified “efficient deterrence theory.”20  
Another advocates an approach that would predicate remedial judgments on a 
showing of harm instead of non-enforcement as the presumptive remedy.21  A 
third author suggests that, even if an agreement is unenforceable due to illegality, 
recovery should be permitted if failure to do so would “stultify” the law.22 
This Article builds on the existing scholarship and joins the search for 
“consistency and rationality.”23  This Article offers the insight that, contrary to 
common belief, courts’ approach to illegal agreements shows a consistent 
pattern.  A review of randomly selected cases24 shows that the courts have, by 
and large, consistently (albeit implicitly) applied the lesser evil principle25 in 
adjudicating the disputes.26  Based on this insight, this Article advocates for a 
                                                 
 16. Note, A Law and Economics Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1445, 1445 (2006) [hereinafter Harvard Note 2006]. 
 17. George A. Strong, The Enforceability of Illegal Contracts, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 347‒
48 (1961) (noting that unenforceable contracts may become so in a “changing socio-economic 
environment”). 
 18. Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 120‒21; Harvard Note 2006, supra note 16, at 1445. 
 19. Adam B. Badawi, Harm, Ambiguity, and the Regulation of Illegal Contracts, 17 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 483, 487 (2010); Birks, supra note 15, at 156; Friedman, supra note 2, at 564‒66; 
Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 120‒21 (offering a unified efficient deterrence theory with regard to 
the judicial relief provided upon finding of illegality); Harvard Note 2006, supra note 16, at 1465‒
66 (offering a law and economics approach with regard to the non-enforcement remedies). 
 20. Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 121‒22. 
 21. Badawi, supra note 19, at 487. 
 22. Birks, supra note 15, at  160, 191. 
 23. Id. at 203. 
 24. Due to the enormous volume of cases addressing this issue, this article relies only on 
selected random review of cases.  For example, the search term: contract or agreement /5 illegal or 
“public policy” yielded 486 cases total in the Westlaw U.S. Supreme Court cases database alone 
on September 10, 2014.  The same search for cases after January 1, 2000 in the All State and Federal 
database on Westlaw yielded over 10,000 results.  The case review focused on only those cases 
involving contract disputes between private parties and where illegality was raised as a defense. 
 25. The word “evil” as used in this article does not refer to an event or consequence that is 
deemed morally wrong, as used in a typical moralist debate.  For examples of such, see Gabriella 
Blum, The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil”, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2‒3 (2010).  In this article, 
“evil” is used in a broader,  generic sense to refer to any harm, injury, or compromise of an 
important principle, as used by courts or some other scholars.  See, e.g., Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. 
Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 68 (1873) (using the word “evils” to describe the injuries to the 
public resulting from contracts in restraint of trade); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989). 
 26. No court appears to have explicitly acknowledged the lesser evil principle in resolving 
the illegality dispute based on a randomly selected case review and a targeted search in the All State 
and Federal database on Westlaw, using the search terms “contract or agreement /s illegal! and 
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more explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle when courts are called upon 
to resolve disputes involving illegal agreements.  This Article, the first to 
advocate for an explicit recognition of the lesser evil principle in private law, 
draws upon the courts’ explicit adoption of the principle in criminal and tort law 
and its implicit adoption of the principle when resolving illegal agreement 
disputes. 
The principle forwarded in this Article is not impermeable from disputation.  
The principle itself does not provide a desired substantive standard.27  It does 
not readily provide the clarity and certainty desired because it does not answer 
certain fundamental questions; namely, what the evils are, and, more 
importantly, which of the evils society deems as the lesser.28  This deficiency, 
however, is more attributable to the nature of the interests implicated.29  Despite 
its limitations, the lesser evil principle provides a better understanding of courts’ 
                                                 
“lesser evil” on September 10, 2014.”  Some U.S. Supreme Court cases have described the 
consequences in terms of evils.  See, e.g., Oregon Steam Nav. Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 68.  Some 
lower courts have also expressed the same sentiment.  Appeal of Bredin, 92 Pa. 241, 247 (Pa. 1879) 
(allowing an illegality defense where the plaintiff obtained a judgment on a note given by the 
defendant, so that the defendant would not be prosecuted for forgery, “to prevent the evil which 
would be produced by enforcing the contract or allowing it to stand”); Gaspard v. Offshore Crane 
& Equip., Inc., No. CIV.A. 94-261, 1998 WL 388597, at *5 (E.D. La. July 8, 1998) (using the word 
“evil” to describe actions that are deemed to be against the public policy of a state). 
 27. Re’em Segev, Moral Justification, Administrative Power and Emergencies, 53 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 629, 631 (2005); see Martha Minow, What Is the Greatest Evil?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2134, 
2139 (2005) (noting the “central difficulty” with identifying evil is that “[e]vil is obvious only in 
retrospect”) (quoting GLORIA STEINEM, If Hitler Were Alive, Whose Side Would He Be On?, in 
OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS 332, 346 (2d ed. 1995)).  The lesser evil 
principle is similar to the proportionality principle, which the Court has adopted in its constitutional 
review of government actions.  See Peter P. Swire, Proportionality for High-Tech Searches, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 751, 751 (2009).  However, that principle itself does not provide a criterion.  Pamela 
S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal 
Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 882‒83 (2004) (pointing out that “proportionality is both an 
inherently alluring and an inevitably unsatisfactory measure of constitutionality. . . .  [T]he problem 
lies in translating the principle into a standard for judicial oversight.  For all the Court’s invocation 
of objective factors, it turns out that a key aspect of proportionality review remains fundamentally 
subjective”); John T. Noonan, Jr., Religious Liberty at the Stake, 84 VA. L. REV. 459, 470‒71 
(1998) (criticizing the proportionality test as “extraordinary” and unsupported by precedent). 
 28. In our system of government, as adjudicators of contract disputes, the judicial branch has 
the duty to interpret and apply the law.  The Judicial Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/our-government/judicial-branch (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).  The lesser evil 
principle, however, does not tell us who is in the best position to answer these questions.  The 
author assumes that the courts are the ones that are entrusted with answering these questions.  
However, this Article does not address the issue of the proper role of courts in determining what 
public policy is or whether the courts have usurped the legislature’s role in declaring what public 
policy is. 
 29. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 
8‒9 (Princeton Univ. Press 2004) (noting where a lesser evil position applies, the analysis will be 
complicated as “there are no trump cards, no table-clearing justifications or claims” that simplify 
the inquiry). 
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adjudication of illegal agreement disputes30 and provides a more predictive 
framework for how U.S. courts approach the complex issues presented by illegal 
agreements.31  An explicit adoption of the principle would allow courts to begin 
the process of refining the substantive standards when resolving illegal 
agreement disputes.32  This would lead to more certainty in the marketplace.  
Finally, because courts have by and large been following the principle already, 
the implementation of explicit adoption would not be overly burdensome. 
To provide a context for the discussions, Part I of this Article introduces the 
lesser evil principle and the general areas where the principle has been applied.33  
Part II briefly reviews the explicit adoption by U.S. courts of the principle in the 
field of criminal and tort law.  Part III sets forth examples of implicit judicial 
adoption of the principle in resolving illegal agreement disputes.  Part IV 
advances arguments in favor of an explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle.  
Finally, this Article concludes with an argument for the explicit adoption of the 
lesser evil principle when resolving illegal agreement disputes. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF THE LESSER EVIL PRINCIPLE 
Originating from two great ancient classical Greek philosophers, Aristotle and 
Epicurus,34 the lesser evil principle35 applies to situations where an actor is 
forced to choose between competing options, all of which breach a moral 
principle.36  The principle describes a pragmatic (albeit controversial) way to 
                                                 
 30. Many common law contract doctrines are vague and incomplete.  See Curtis Bridgeman, 
Why Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy: Positivism, Formalism, and the 
Specification of Rules in Contract Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1469 (2008).  However, 
incompleteness alone does not render a doctrine ineffective, rather the doctrines can be viewed as 
partial plans to be refined over time.  Id. 
 31. This Article does not intend to participate in the greater moral debate concerning the pros 
and cons of the lesser evil principle.  The lesser evil doctrine is undoubtedly highly contingent, and 
determining which of the evils implicated is the lesser one will inevitably reflect the cultural, moral, 
and legal values of each individual society.  See Blum, supra note 25, at 55; see e.g., IGNATIEFF, 
supra note 29, at 19 (discussing the lesser evil principle in the context of the fight against terrorism 
following September 11, and acknowledging the need to resort to certain measures under the lesser 
evil principle under certain conditions).  Nor does this Article intend to join the debate about the 
pros and cons of the public policy doctrine.  See, e.g., Prince, supra note 5, at 166. 
 32. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN 
AMERICAN LAW 169 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009). 
 33. With respect to assessing which is the greater evil, this Article does not intend to engage 
in the debate concerning the proper role of the judiciary in determining what public policy is. 
 34. Sean Molloy, Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau and the Political Ethics of the Lesser Evil, 
5 J. INT’L POL. THEORY 94, 99‒100 (2009) (explaining that Aristotle discussed the lesser evil 
principle approvingly and considered it “good”). 
 35. The principle is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of the lesser evil or the doctrine of 
the necessary evil. 
 36. See IGNATIEFF, supra note 29, at 8. 
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solve the dilemma—by choosing the lesser of two evils.37  The principle has 
often been applied to rationalize certain actions in international relations and 
politics.38  In law, the principle has been mostly used to justify certain defenses 
against criminal charges, for example, the concept of necessity in both common 
and civil law traditions.39  Even though the principle itself is widely accepted or 
tolerated, it is far more difficult to determine what the evils are and which of the 
evils is the lesser.40 
The lesser evil principle automatically invokes the broader philosophical 
debate about what is considered “evil.”41  Where one stands on certain issues 
depends on one’s political and moral values.42  For example, people who believe 
in values important to a democratic system are likely to view certain putative 
evils differently from those who share beliefs consistent with an authoritarian 
regime.43  Further, what is deemed the more, or lesser, of the evils also changes 
over time.44  Such analyses are often complicated by decision makers’ failure to 
articulate the values behind their reasoning.45 
                                                 
 37. This Article does not intend to join the broader debate about the morality of this principle.  
See, e.g., IGNATIEFF, supra note 29, at 5‒6 (addressing issues related to the permissibility of the 
lesser evil doctrine within the boundaries of a democracy committed to the rule of law). 
 38. It is beyond the scope of this Article to have a detailed discussion of the application of the 
lesser evil doctrine in political and international relations.  See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, On the Use 
and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State Responsibility, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 447, 447‒48 (2012) 
(discussing how the lesser evil doctrine has been used in politics and international relations as well 
as some of the controversies surrounding the doctrine). 
 39. Blum, supra note 25, at 32 (noting that there are important variations in application of the 
lesser evil doctrine depending on one’s values and beliefs). 
 40. See Segev, supra note 27, at 631 (stating that the lesser evil principle “seems obviously 
justified and widely accepted”). 
 41. IGNATIEFF, supra note 29, at 12. 
 42. Blum, supra note 25, at 2.  As one judge pointed out, with respect to when sufficient fraud 
exists to avoid a contract, differences in outcomes depend on the kind of policy that the judge would 
prefer to adopt: 
If the judge writing the opinion believed that it is better to “encourage negligence in the 
foolish than fraud in the deceitful,” then a more liberal view is taken as to what constitutes 
fraud.  On the other hand, if the judge writing the opinion believed that it is better to 
“encourage fraud in the deceitful,” then the opinion is written with the view of upholding 
the contract. 
Birdsall v. Coon, 139 S.W. 243, 246 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911) (citation omitted). 
 43. See Richard L. Barnes, Delusion by Analysis: The Surrogate Mother Problem, 34 S.D. L. 
REV. 1, 3‒4 (1989) (presenting examples of differing values depending on one’s political, moral, 
and religious beliefs). 
 44. See Shell, supra note 11, at 477 (noting the more recent Supreme Court cases that have 
enforced contractual waivers of certain constitutional rights); Wallihan v. Hughes, 82 S.E.2d 553, 
558 (Va. 1954) (describing public policy as a “will-o’-the-wisp of the law [that] varies and changes 
with the interests, habits, needs, sentiments, and fashions of the day”). 
 45. See Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A 
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 289 (2007). 
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II.  EXPLICIT APPLICATION OF THE LESSER EVIL PRINCIPLE IN U.S. CRIMINAL 
AND TORT LAW 
U.S. law has explicitly adopted the lesser evil principle in criminal and tort 
law.46  The Model Penal Code permits a criminal defendant to assert a choice of 
evil justification defense under certain conditions.47  The defense applies if the 
defendant was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil to prevent 
imminent harm where he reasonably anticipated a causal connection between his 
actions and preventing the harm.48  In addition, the defendant must not have 
other legal alternatives available to avoid inflicting the harm, and the defendant 
must not cause the foreboding situation through his own negligence or 
recklessness.49  For example, in criminal law the argument of self-defense under 
certain conditions justifies an otherwise intentional homicide.50  So, when A is 
faced with the choice of either killing B or being killed by B, A is legally 
permitted to kill B—if such is unavoidable.51  Criminal law deems self-defense 
(essentially the sanctioning of the intentional killing of another) as the lesser evil 
in this limited situation. 
U.S. tort law has also explicitly adopted the lesser evil principle in the concept 
of a necessity defense.52  For example, a defendant in a civil case can respond to 
a tort action claim based on trespass—the invasion of an owner’s exclusive 
possessory interest in his property53—by asserting the defense of necessity.54  
                                                 
 46. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CALIF. 
L. REV. 943, 969 (1999); 1 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN, & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW 
OF TORTS, § 142, at 449‒50 (2d ed. 2011). 
 47. For a detailed discussion of the common law defense of necessity, see Michael H. 
Hoffheimer, Codifying Necessity: Legislative Resistance to Enacting Choice-Of-Evils Defenses to 
Criminal Liability, 82 TUL. L. REV. 191, 197 (2007) (pointing out that “[c]ourts have always 
accepted necessity as a principle limiting the reach of overbroad criminal prohibitions and 
defenses”); Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification, 
Not An Excuse — And Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 884 (2003). 
 48. Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 47, at 884. 
 49. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (1985) provides: 
Section 3.02. Justification Generally: Choice of Evils 
(1) Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or 
to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such 
conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense 
charged . . . . 
 50. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). 
 51. Id. 
 52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197, at 355 (1965) provides:  
(1) One is privileged to enter or remain on land in the possession of another if it is or 
reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent serious harm to (a) the actor, or his land or 
chattels, or (b) the other or a third person, or the land or chattels of either, unless the actor 
knows or has reason to know that the one for whose benefit he enters is unwilling that he 
shall take such action. 
 53. Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 649 P.2d 922, 925 (Cal. 1982). 
 54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197, at 355 (1965). 
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While allowing the defense of necessity harms an owner’s interest in exclusive 
possession, courts deem it the lesser (or necessary) evil.55 
By allowing the defenses of necessity and self-defense justification for 
otherwise criminal or tortious conduct, U.S. laws and judges have explicitly 
incorporated the lesser evil principle in the adjudication of difficult cases 
involving the relationship between the state and private individuals, and between 
private individuals in the public law arena.56  These principle-based defenses 
allow courts to weigh competing values implicated in these cases.57 
III.  THE INVISIBLE PRESENCE OF THE LESSER EVIL PRINCIPLE IN ILLEGAL 
AGREEMENT DISPUTES 
In contrast to the explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle in criminal and 
tort law, U.S. courts have generally not explicitly adopted the principle in 
contract law or in resolving illegal agreement disputes.58 
The prevailing view of illegal agreements is that U.S. courts generally follow 
the rule of non-enforcement with multiple exceptions depending on the specifics 
of each case.59  However, a close examination of many U.S. courts’ reasoning 
in numerous cases shows that courts’ decisions turn more on their concern for 
                                                 
 55. See, e.g., Rossi v. DelDuca, 181 N.E.2d 591, 593 (Mass. 1962) (“[O]ne is privileged to 
enter land in the possession of another if it is, or reasonably appears to be, necessary to prevent 
serious harm . . . .”). 
 56. See, e.g., Boaz Sangero, A New Defense for Self-Defense, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 475, 532 
(2006). 
 57. See Hoffheimer, supra note 47, at 229 (discussing the role that judges and jurors have in 
evaluating competing values). 
 58. See Note, Principles Governing Recovery by Parties to Illegal Contracts, 26 HARV. L. 
REV. 738, 738‒39 (1913) [hereinafter Harvard Note 1913].  One could also argue that courts have 
implicitly adopted the lesser evil principle in recognizing certain contract law defenses such as 
fraud, incompetence, duress, undue influence, mistake, misrepresentation, unconscionability, 
illegality, and void for public policy, as well as contract law excuses, such as impossibility or 
frustration of purpose.  The lesser evil principle offers the overarching principle for all of contract 
law defenses and excuses.  Courts in these situations generally chose not to enforce the contract 
because non-enforcement does less harm than enforcement.  See id. at 738‒39.  Enforcing contracts 
in these specified situations harms some important values, such as fairness, and creates adverse 
incentives to engage in fraud or other unsavory practices such as duress or undue influence.  See 
id. at 739.  Therefore, enforcement would have been the greater evil than the negative impact on 
parties’ freedom to contract. 
 59. For a detailed discussion of the general rule related to the illegality defense and the various 
exceptions, see Birks, supra note 15, at 158; Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 116‒18, 126; Strong, supra 
note 17, at 347‒48, 351, 354‒55, 361‒62; Wade, supra note 10, at 31, 47; Yale Note, supra note 8, 
at 1108‒09; see also Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 204 P.2d 37, 40 (Cal. 1949) (“[A] party 
to an illegal contract or an illegal transaction cannot come into a court of law and ask it to carry out 
the illegal contract or to enforce rights arising out of the illegal transaction.”); Arcidi v. Nat’l Assoc. 
of Gov. Employees, Inc., 856 N.E.2d 167, 171 (Mass. 2006) (“[T]he general rule is that a court 
leaves parties to an illegal contract in the same position as it finds them.”); Ledbetter v. Townsend, 
15 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“It is well settled that the courts of Tennessee will not 
enforce obligations arising out of a contract or transaction that is illegal.”). 
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the consequences of their choices, rather than on the illegality of the 
agreements.60  These cases show a pattern of courts choosing the option that 
tolerates the less harmful consequence when considering the other available 
options.  That pattern is consistent with an application of the lesser evil principle 
in other fields of law.61 
There are a number of potential evils, or potential kinds of damage, important 
to the public interest that are implicated by illegal agreement disputes.  A number 
of cases, depicting U.S. courts’ attempt to choose the lesser evil when 
adjudicating these complicated disputes, support this notion.  By examining 
closely the insight sustaining these courts’ decisions, specifically the articulated 
or implicit rationale supporting their rulings, one will discern the already 
existing presence of the lesser evil principle in illegal agreement disputes.62 
A.  Potential Evils Implicated in Illegal Agreement Disputes 
Courts’ analyses show that they are keenly aware of the consequences of their 
choices.63  Courts explicitly, and sometimes implicitly, chose a certain option 
because of their concern that the alternative would damage or undermine an 
important public interest.64  There are numerous potential evils courts have 
identified when resolving disputes arising out of illegal agreements.65  This 
sometimes requires reading between the lines while understanding and 
recognizing the dominant values of our society in the context of our governing 
system. 
                                                 
 60. See Birks, supra note 15, at 158 (“The inquiry is constantly an inquiry into consistency 
and rationality, not into turpitude.  Turpitude may have no role at all.  Or it may be that gross 
turpitude can have a role in a rare case, as a long-stop.”).  As one commentator pointed out, the 
“real question at issue is whether in any particular case, the ends of the law will be furthered or 
defeated by granting the relief asked.”  Harvard Note 1913, supra note 58, at 740. 
 61. See Strong, supra note 17, at 348, 354‒60, 362, 364‒65, 367‒73. 
 62. Part of the analytical difficulty lies in the fact that courts often fail to explicitly articulate 
reasons for their decisions.  For example, in one of the early cases, the Supreme Court praised the 
non-enforcement rule as “a salutary one, founded in morality and good policy, and which 
recommends itself to the good sense of every man as soon as it is stated.”  Armstrong v. Toler, 24 
U.S. (11 Wheat.) 258, 260 (1826).  In another case, the Court justified its decision to enforce an 
illegal agreement by announcing that the “most startling and dangerous consequences” would 
follow if the Court refused to enforce the agreement.  Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 
540, 547 (1902).  The Court, in neither case, explicitly elaborated on concerns addressing enforcing, 
or refusing to enforce, the illegal agreement.  For this reason, a certain amount of reading between 
the lines is necessary. 
 63. See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 360 (1873); Bein v. Heath, 47 
U.S. (6 How.) 228, 247 (1848); Gates v. Rivers Constr. Co., 515 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Alaska 1973). 
 64. See infra, Part III.B.2.a.iii. 
 65. See infra, Part III.A.1‒7.  Because of the myriad ways in which illegal agreement disputes 
can arise, with potential harm to numerous public policy interests, this Article does not purport to 
capture all the public policy interests implicated.  Rather, it highlights the public interests most 
often cited by courts to support their choices when resolving illegal agreement disputes. 
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1.  Undermining the Legitimacy of the Law and the Good Name of the Court 
A major apprehension of U.S. courts, when resolving an illegality dispute, 
concerns the risk of undermining the legitimacy of the law and the dignity of the 
court system.66  The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated this concern loudly and 
clearly in support of the general rule of non-enforcement.  For example, the 
Court pointed out that a court of justice cannot be the “handmaid of iniquity”67 
or “degrade itself” by using its power to aid those who have violated the law.68  
Because of this concern, courts have often referred to the non-enforcement rule 
as a fundamental principle.69 
This concern is understandable because of the court’s role in our system of 
government.70  The U.S. Constitution fashioned the judiciary as the mechanism 
through which laws are enforced.71  Enforcing an agreement where the parties 
attempt to engage in illegal transactions undermines the very essence of the 
court’s function.72  Courts loath being put in a position where they may run the 
risk of being perceived as aiding or abetting any violation of the law.73 
In addition, maintaining the law is important to every functioning 
government.74  In a democratic country where the rule of law prevails, public 
laws express the collective will of the people through a representative 
                                                 
 66. Bartle v. Nutt, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 184, 189 (1830); Bank of the United States v. Owens, 27 
U.S. (2 Pet.) 527, 538‒39 (1829); Martin v. Wade, 37 Cal. 168, 176 (1869) (“The Courts, refusing 
to defile their hands with those transactions, deny the parties all relief.”). 
 67. Owens, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 538. 
 68. Bartle, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 189. 
 69. Searles v. Haynes, 129 N.E.2d 362, 366 (Ind. App. 1955) (“It is fundamental that no 
principle of law is more clearly established than that the law will not enforce an illegal 
transaction.”).  Despite its lack of usefulness in assisting with illegal agreement disputes, the fierce 
rhetoric might have inspired the unusual loyalty to the non-enforcement principle. 
 70. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976) (commenting that the role of courts 
is enforcing the law, and that courts have no authority to depart from this role “by a balancing of 
court-devised factors”). 
 71. Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 439, 442 (1872) (identifying the Constitution as 
the source of the judiciary’s authority; therefore, courts could never enforce a contract that would 
impair the supremacy of the Constitution). 
 72. Bank of the United States v. Owens, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 527, 538‒39 (1829). 
 73. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co. of Balt., 130 U.S. 396, 412 (1889) (“We cannot assist 
the plaintiff to get payment for efforts to accomplish what the law declared should not be done . . . 
.”); Owens, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 538 (“The answer would seem to be plain and obvious, that no court 
of justice can in its nature be made the handmaid of iniquity.”); Vaszauskas v. Vaszauskas, 161 A. 
856, 858 (1932) (“It is unquestionably the general rule, upheld by the great weight of authority, that 
no court will lend its assistance in any way toward carrying out the terms of a contract, the inherent 
purpose of which is to violate the law.”). 
 74. See MAX WEBER, THE VOCATION LECTURES 34 (Rodney Livingstone trans., David 
Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., 2004) (“If the state is to survive, those who are ruled over must 
always acquiesce in the authority that is claimed by the rulers of the day.”). 
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government.75  Laws are enacted to govern the relationship between the state 
and its people.76  To allow private parties to contract irrespective of the law, and 
then expect judicial intervention and remedy undermines the legitimacy of, and 
the public interest promoted by, the law.77 
2.  Overstepping the Boundaries of the Court’s Constitutional Role 
The Constitution created three separate and equal branches of government.78  
With respect to the rule of law, legislators are tasked with enacting laws and are 
in the best position to declare what public policy is,79 while the judiciary is 
charged with interpreting and enforcing laws.80  As the U.S. Supreme Court 
pointed out, the judiciary “can listen only to the mandates of law; and can tread 
only that path which is marked out by duty.”81  Resolving illegal agreement 
disputes can force courts to wrestle with the limits of their role in our system of 
government, typically because these disputes can implicate situations where the 
legislature has not spoken explicitly on the public interests worthy of being 
protected.82  In those situations, courts are left to divine proper public policy,83—
                                                 
 75. Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1307 (2001) (“In the broadest terms, the rule of law requires that the 
[democratic] state only subject the citizenry to publicly promulgated laws, that the state’s legislative 
function be separate from the adjudicative function, and that no one within the polity be above the 
law.”); Rule of Law: Essential Principles, DEMOCRACY WEB, http://www.democracyweb.org/ 
rule/principles.php (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (stating that in a democracy, “the rule of law could 
be defined as the subjugation of state power to a country’s constitution and laws, established or 
adopted through popular consent”). 
 76. See WEBER, supra note 74, at 34. 
 77. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 378 (1873). 
 78. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 354 (13th Ed. 
1997). 
 79. See IGNATIEFF, supra note 29, at 3. 
 80. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (3rd ed. 2009). 
 81. Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 438 (1830). 
 82. See Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981) (“[I]t can be said 
that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State 
collectively.  It is to be found in the State’s constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in 
its judicial decisions.”); 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 12:2, 
at 767‒71 (4th ed. 2009). 
 83. This is also the reason why numerous scholars have criticized the doctrine, fearing that it 
gives judges too much discretion in determining public policy.  Likewise, “[u]nder the current 
public policy doctrine, judges may draw . . . on their own views of what public interest or morality 
requires . . . .  The power to overrule market choices granted by public policy doctrines gives courts 
flexibility in administering justice, but adds a degree of uncertainty to commercial transactions.”  
See, e.g., Shell, supra note 11, at 442.  See also Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson, Transnational 
Bankruptcies: Section 304 and Beyond, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 329, 340 (considering the 
vagueness of statutory guidelines, “courts are left to decide each case according to their own 
idiosyncratic inclinations, leading to inconsistent and unpredictable results”); Moran v. Harris, 182 
Cal. Rptr. 519, 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (“[J]uridical realization of the meandering nature of ‘public 
policy’ necessitates judicial restraint.”).  In addition, judicial consonance with public policy has 
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often assessing, among multiple competing interests, which is more important—
a task constitutionally delegated to the legislature.84  As a result, courts thrust 
into this situation have often been accused of legislating from the bench.85 
3.  Restraint on Freedom of Contract 
Another potential evil implicated by an illegality dispute is the potential to 
restrain parties’ freedom of contract.86  Freedom of contract is a fundamental 
principle of U.S. contract law;87 it is a part of our national identity, built on 
respect for individual autonomy,88 and it is reflected in the general rule that 
private agreements are enforced as bargained for by the parties.89  Contracts are 
generally viewed as private ordering by the parties. 90  A court’s refusal to 
enforce a private agreement is considered a restraint on parties’ freedom of 
                                                 
been described as “a very unruly horse, . . . once get astride it you never know where it will carry 
you.”  Lynn C. Percival, IV, Public Policy Favoritism in the Online World: Contract Voidability 
Meets the Communications Decency Act, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 165, 182 (2011) (quoting 
Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294 (C.P.) 303 (1824)); but cf., Prince, supra note 5, at 169 
(“The problems spring not from the use of excessive discretion by the courts in traveling new paths 
because of a perceived change in public policy, but more from a failure to follow with 
circumspection the path and principles which have already been laid.”). 
 84. See Leacock, Lotteries and Public Policy in American Law, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 37, 
42, 43‒45 (2012) (“Identifying and declaring violations of public policy is a delicate, subtle, and 
difficult intellectual task.”).  As commented on by Justice Scalia: 
[T]he main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution—or, for that matter, in 
judicial interpretation of any law—is that the judges will mistake their own predilections 
for the law.  Avoiding this error is the hardest part of being a conscientious judge; perhaps 
no conscientious judge ever succeeds entirely. 
Scalia, supra note 25, at 863. 
 85. Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 185, 187 (2007). 
 86. Even the staunchest advocate of freedom of contract concedes that there are limits to that 
freedom.  To that extent, one can say, refusing to enforce illegal agreements will not affect freedom 
of contract at all.  This is definitely true in some extreme cases of highway robbery or murder for 
hire.  However, when the illegality is particularly subtle, it becomes incredibly difficult for a court 
to draw a line, and the court has the potential to infringe upon parties’ freedom to contract.  See 
Yale Note, supra note 8, at 1108, 1113. 
 87. ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 215 (2d ed. 2004). 
 88. Kirsten L. McCaw, Freedom of Contract Versus the Antidiscrimination Principle: A 
Critical Look at the Tension Between Contractual Freedom and Antidiscrimination Provisions, 7 
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 195, 198 (1996) (“The desirability of individual autonomy and economic 
efficiency lies at the core of freedom of contract.”). 
 89. See In re McInnis, 110 P.3d 639, 644 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). 
 90. Buckley, supra note 12, at 139 (noting that “the doctrine of illegality marks off the border 
between public and private ordering”).  This article does not intend to join the debate about whether 
contracts are public or private. 
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contract.91  Accordingly, illegality disputes effectively force the judiciary to 
mark the outer boundaries of private contracting behavior. 
Freedom of contract has been defended on multiple grounds.92  Respecting a 
party’s freedom of contract is said to promote certainty and predictability.93  For 
contracts to function effectively as a risk allocation tool fostering economic 
development, parties need to be able to rely on contracts.94  Certainty of contract 
provides incentives for parties to engage in investment—activities that can be 
socially beneficial.95 
4.  Forfeiture of Property 
Another concern of courts in reviewing illegal agreement disputes is the risk 
of property forfeiture.96  Generally, the judicially imposed forfeiture of property 
is, from a policy standpoint, disfavored.97  This attitude is reflected in the 
property protection afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment98 and the Restatement’s explicit enumeration of the risk of 
forfeiture as one of the factors to be assessed in resolving illegal agreement 
disputes.99 
In the illegal agreement dispute context, risk of property forfeiture exists 
where parties have agreed to an exchange of performances in sequential order.100  
                                                 
 91. See Eldridge v. Johnston, 245 P.2d 239, 245 (Or. 1952) (noting that free and voluntary 
private contracts are “held sacred” and  “shall be enforced by courts of justice”); Yale Note, supra 
note 8, at 1108. 
 92. Volumes have been written on this topic.  This article only offers a brief summary to 
provide a context for discussion.  For a detailed discussion on this topic, see Mark Pettit, Jr., 
Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall,” 79 B.U. L. REV. 263, 352 (1999). 
 93. See Miller, supra note 9, at 1496. 
 94. See Robert Cooter, Doing What You Say: Contracts and Economic Development, 59 ALA. 
L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2008) (stating that “[c]ontractual commitment is the fundamental means for 
economic coordination provided by law”); see also H. Ward Classen, Judicial Intervention in 
Contractual Relationships Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Common Law, 42 S.C. L. 
REV. 379, 383 (1991) (“Because allocating risks through long-term contracts is essential to accurate 
planning and, thus, to the viability of a business in a free market economy, courts rarely excuse 
sophisticated commercial parties from their contractual obligations.”). 
 95. Thorsten Beck, Legal Institutions and Economic Development 22‒24 (CentER Discussion 
Paper Series No. 2010-94), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669100. 
 96. See infra Part III.B.2.b.iii. 
 97. Seaman v. State, 396 S.E.2d 525, 526 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (indicating that statutes 
permitting forfeiture of property are to be strictly construed and limited); Lloyd Capital Corp. v. 
Pat Henchar, Inc., 80 N.Y.2d 124, 128 (1992) (noting that “[a]s a general rule . . . forfeitures by 
operation of law are disfavored, particularly where a defaulting party seeks to raise illegality as ‘a 
sword for personal gain rather than a shield for the public good’”) (quoting Charlebois v. J.M. 
Weller Assocs., Inc., 531 N.E.2d 1288, 1292 (N.Y. 1988)). 
 98. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 99. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 14, § 178(2)(b), at 6. 
 100. See HILLMAN, supra note 87, at 218.  See also Benjamin E. Hermalin et al., Chapter on 
the Law & Economics of Contracts, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, at 4 (2006), 
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For example, A and B agree to engage in an illegal transaction.  Party A performs 
first and then B refuses to perform.  When A sues to recover from B, the court’s 
refusal to enforce the agreement due to illegality would excuse B from any 
obligation and result in A forfeiting property or the value of his services.101 
5.  Corruption of Morals 
Courts are also exceedingly concerned about aiding or facilitating any 
transactions that would encourage corruption,102 and are especially vigilant 
against aiding or facilitating any transactions that would encourage a corruption 
of morals.103  Courts’ concerns with respect to corruption are well-founded 
considering its remaining prevalence, despite universal condemnation.104  
Corruption imposes many costs on societies.105  It interferes with government’s 
ability to perform efficiently,106 undermining the legitimacy of, and the people’s 
confidence in, government.107  As a result, the law values honest service by 
public servants.108 
                                                 
http://www.econ.uiuc.edu/~avillami/course-files/contract_law_handbook_article.pdf (last visted 
Feb. 24, 2015). 
 101. See, e.g., Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 263 (1880); Farbenfabriken Bayer A.G. 
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 307 F.2d 207, 210 (3d Cir. 1962) (“In such cases the aid of the court is 
denied, not for the benefit of the defendant, but because public policy demands that it should be 
denied without regard to the interests of individual parties.”) (quoting Cont’l Wall Paper Co. v. 
Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 262 (1909)); Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension 
Co., Inc., 572 P.2d 412, 414 (Wyo. 1977) (holding that in consideration of the silence of the 
legislature, the defendant was not obligated to pay for illegal gambling debt). 
 102. See e.g., Oscanyan, 103 U.S. at 273 (commenting that “[p]ersonal influence to be 
exercised over an officer of government in the procurement of contracts, . . . is not a vendible article 
in our system of laws and morals”). 
 103. Id. at 277; Bartle v. Nutt, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 184, 188 (1830). 
 104. David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach; The C2 
Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 593, 595 (2000) (stating that “even 
through the 1990s . . . corruption bec[a]me one of the most important policy issues in the 
international economy”). 
 105. Id. at 596‒99. 
 106. Id. at 612. 
 107. Id. at 594. 
 108. See John D. Feerick, Toward a Model Whistleblowing Law, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 585, 
594 (1992) (stating “we expect . . . public servants conform to a higher set of standards than simply 
avoiding breaking the law, a model law must account for the problems of corruption, conflict of 
interest, abuse of position, gross waste of funds and gross mismanagement in order to effectuate 
this goal”); Joshua A. Kobrin, Betraying Honest Services: Theories of Trust and Betrayal Applied 
to the Mail Fraud Statute and § 1346, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 779, 781 (2006) (noting the 
judiciary’s recognition of congressional objectives in amending fraudulent mail practices in the 
early twentieth century to impose a broader “honest services” duty upon public employees). 
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6.  Incentives to Engage in More Illegal, Fraudulent, or Opportunistic 
Behavior 
Courts are also concerned about another evil: creating incentives for parties 
to engage in more illegal or other socially undesirable conduct such as fraud or 
opportunistic behavior.109  The general rule of non-enforcement is often justified 
on the basis of deterring illegal behavior.110  However, under certain 
circumstances, non-enforcement may encourage, rather than deter illegal 
behavior.111  Courts have often commented on this unfortunate aspect of 
pernicious actors engaging in opportunistic behavior with the expectation of 
taking advantage of the illegality defense in order to obtain a windfall.112 
Similar to the property forfeiture context, opportunistic behavior is more 
likely to exist when parties to an illegal agreement perform their obligations 
sequentially.113  Courts’ refusal to enforce an agreement due to illegality will 
sometimes result in forfeiture of property for Party A, but a windfall for Party 
B.114  These situations are ripe for opportunistic behavior, especially where an 
illegal transaction generates profit, and the parties dispute about how to divide 
the profits arising out of the illegal transaction.115 
7.  Injury to Other Miscellaneous Public Interests 
Cases show that there are multiple public interests that courts seek to protect 
when resolving an illegality dispute, as much varied as the laws allegedly 
                                                 
 109. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520‒21 (1959) (commenting that “the courts are 
to be guided by the overriding general policy, as Mr. Justice Holmes put it, ‘of preventing people 
from getting other people’s property for nothing when they purport to be buying it’”) (quoting 
Cont’l Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 271 (1909) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)); Gates v. Rivers Constr. Co., Inc., 515 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Alaska 1973) (expressing 
concern that a non-enforcement remedy might encourage employers to “knowingly . . . employ 
[illegal] aliens and then, with impunity, . . . refuse [to] pay them for their services”); 
Nizamuddowlah v. Bengal Cabaret, Inc., 399 N.Y.S.2d 854, 857 (App. Div. 1977) (ordering, under 
a claim of unjust enrichment, recovery in favor of the plaintiff because the defendant was 
manipulating the system through immigration laws would likely continue to engage in the same 
conduct). 
 110. See McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669‒70 (1899). 
 111. See infra, Part III.B.2.b. 
 112. See, e.g., Kosuga, 358 U.S. at 520‒21; McMullen, 174 U.S. at 669. 
 113. George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 941, 954‒55 (1992). 
 114. See, e.g., Parente v. Pirozzoli, 866 A.2d 629, 638 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).  The court noted: 
Although the end result of holding the 1995 partnership agreement illegal may be to 
allow the defendant to receive a windfall at the plaintiff’s expense, our Supreme Court 
has stated “that this result is common, and . . . necessary in many cases in which contracts 
are deemed unenforceable on the grounds of furthering overriding public policies.” 
Id. (quoting Solomon v. Gilmore, 731 A.2d 280, 293 (Conn. 1999) (alterations in original)). 
 115. See infra Part III.B.2.c. 
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violated by the content of the agreements.116  For example, in discussing the 
validity of the contracts in restraint of trade, the U.S. Supreme Court identified 
as evils “the injury to the public by being deprived of the restricted party’s 
industry . . . [and] the injury to the party himself by being precluded from 
pursuing his occupation and thus being prevented from supporting himself and 
his family.”117 
In another case addressing the validity of contractual waivers of liability by 
common carriers, the U.S. Supreme Court identified the public policy 
underlying the common carrier law as promoting the utmost care and diligence 
in providing safe transportation to the public.118 
B.  Courts’ Choices Consistent with the Lesser Evil Principle 
The following cases show how courts have by and large made their choices 
consistent with the lesser evil principle.  To resolve illegal agreement disputes, 
courts typically need to address two questions: the threshold question of whether 
the agreement implicated is illegal; and second, what form of remedy is 
proper.119  Courts have multiple remedies to choose from depending on 
plaintiffs’ theories.120  Even though courts have not explicitly adopted the lesser 
evil principle to support their choices, their analyses strongly suggest their 
decisions are grounded in the principle.121 
1.  Threshold Question of Illegality: Limiting the Scope of Illegality as the 
Lesser Evil 
Courts, addressing the threshold question of illegality, have attempted to limit 
its scope in multiple ways.  First, courts generally presume legality,122 requiring 
                                                 
 116. See, e.g., Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 70 (1873) (noting 
public policy arguments against agreements restraining trade); Nizamuddowlah v. Bengal Cabaret, 
Inc., 399 N.Y.S.2d 854, 857 (App. Div. 1997) (citing public interests in discouraging employers 
from deceptive practices); Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Co., 572 P.2d 412, 414 (Wyo. 
1977) (indicating a public interest in discouraging illegal gambling). 
 117. Oregon Steam Nav. Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 68. 
 118. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 378 (1873). 
 119. See Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 163 n.4 (citing Furmston, supra note 10, at 267). 
 120. See infra Parts III.B.2.c.i‒ii. 
 121. Over one-hundred years ago, one scholar commented on the possible injustice of 
generally applying the non-enforcement rule.  The scholar observed courts’ willingness to develop 
various limitations on the general rule and continued: “While these limitations on the general 
doctrine have considerably lessened its evils, they furnish no relief in many cases in which the rule 
works a palpable injustice . . . . ” Harvard Note 1913, supra note 58, at 739. 
 122. See Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408 (1977) (noting that the “general rule of 
construction presumes the legality and enforceability of contracts, ambiguously worded contracts 
should not be interpreted to render them illegal and unenforceable where the wording lends itself 
to a logically acceptable construction that renders them legal and enforceable”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
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that the defense of illegality be affirmatively pled.123  Courts have also tried to 
assess how closely connected the agreement seeking to be enforced is to the 
unlawfulness of forbidden acts, often referred to as the collateral agreement 
rule.124  Another way that courts have attempted to limit the scope of illegality 
is by narrowly interpreting the law allegedly violated.125 
For example, in an antebellum case, a group of slave traders tried to avoid 
payment of notes given as part of the purchase price.126  Even though the 
Constitution of the State of Mississippi prohibited the sale of slaves imported 
from other states, the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the prohibition and 
enforced the sales agreements, finding that the sales agreements were not invalid 
until the legislature had acted.127 
By adopting a presumption against illegality and narrowly construing 
illegality, courts avoid the greater evil of unduly impinging on parties’ freedom 
of contract and the resulting uncertainty.128  This narrow construction allows 
courts to avoid a host of other evils that often accompany a non-enforcement 
choice, such as forfeiture of property and incentives for opportunistic 
behavior.129 
2.  Courts’ Choices of Remedies 
Upon a finding of illegality, courts have multiple options at their disposal.  
They can refuse to enforce an illegal agreement, or they can enforce an illegal 
agreement despite its illegality.130  For example, if a plaintiff seeks to recover 
                                                 
 123. Brearton v. De Witt, 170 N.E. 119, 120 (N.Y. 1930). 
 124. See, e.g., Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 551 (1902); Armstrong v. 
Am. Exch. Nat’l Bank, 133 U.S. 433, 467‒68 (1890). 
 125. See, e.g., Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 501‒02 (1841); De Valengin’s 
Adm’rs v. Duffy, 39 U.S. 282, 291 (1840) (refusing to find a contract illegal even though the parties 
lied about property ownership in order to get reimbursement from another government during a 
war). 
 126. Groves, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 497. 
 127. Id. at 500‒01. 
 128. Cont’l Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co. 212 U.S. 227, 270‒71 (1909) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting) (stating that “because the policy of not furthering the purposes of the trust is less 
important than the policy of preventing people from getting other people’s property for nothing 
when they purport to be buying it . . . it makes no difference whether he is glad or sorry for the 
result”); Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 116‒17; Yale Note, supra note 8, at 1108 (pointing out that 
the non-enforcement rule “conflict[s] with the more basic policy of preserving the inviolability of 
contracts”). 
 129. See D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 236 U.S 165, 176 (1915) (pointing out 
that individuals may be prompted by selfish motives to attack the legality of a seller organization); 
Wade, supra note 10, at 55 (“To a defrauder, the knowledge that the law will permit him to keep 
ill-gotten gains will be an incentive to induce another to participate in an illegal contract.”). 
 130. See infra Part III.B.2.a‒b. 
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money paid under the illegal transaction under quasi-contractual theories, courts 
can deny recovery or allow recovery despite the illegality.131 
Courts have developed multiple theories to give them the flexibility to choose 
remedies, adopting rules such as the distinction between malum in se and malum 
prohibitum,132 the principle of in pari delicto,133 the collateral agreement 
doctrine,134 the protected class doctrine,135 failure of consideration,136 
rescission,137 and unjust enrichment.138  These theories provide courts with the 
flexibility to grant or deny relief as called for by the facts of a particular case.139  
Courts have by and large followed the lesser evil principle and applied the rules 
in a way to achieve a consistent result: avoiding the greater evils. 
a.  The Non-Enforcement Remedy as the Lesser Evil 
The following sets forth some examples where courts have refused to enforce 
the terms of an illegal agreement to avoid some greater evil.  These cases can be 
roughly grouped into three representative scenarios: courts’ avoidance of 
undermining the legitimacy or the law and the court; courts’ avoidance of 
incentivizing fraud and corruption; and courts’ avoidance of undermining other 
important public interests.140 
i.  Scenario One: To Avoid Undermining the Legitimacy of the Law and 
the Court 
Under this scenario, courts generally have denied plaintiffs relief because it 
would have in some form aided plaintiffs’ violation of law.  For example, in 
Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore,141 the plaintiff helped the defendant 
negotiate an agreement that state law expressly prohibited.142  When the 
                                                 
 131. See infra Part III.B.2.c‒d. 
 132. See, e.g., Lloyd Capital Corp. v. Pat Henchar, Inc., 603 N.E.2d 246, 248 (N.Y. 1992); 
John E. Rosasco Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen Dairy Co., 276 N.Y. 274, 280 (1937); Yale Note, supra 
note 8, at 1108. 
 133. See Note, In Pari Delicto, Under the Federal Securities Laws: Bateman Eichler, Hill 
Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 345, 347 (1987) (discussing the common law defense 
and its specific application in securities litigation). 
 134. See Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 159. 
 135. See id. at 156. 
 136. See, e.g., N.Y. & Pa. Co. v. Cunard Coal Co., 132 A. 828, 831 (Pa. 1926). 
 137. See Harvard Note 1913, supra note 58, at 740. 
 138. See Wade, supra note 10, at 52‒53 (discussing different reasons that the courts have used 
to support their decisions to allow or refuse recovery where there is a finding of illegality). 
 139. Id. at 62. 
 140. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all possible factual scenarios that can 
implicate the illegality issue.  The scenarios merely provide selected examples for the purpose of 
discussion. 
 141. 130 U.S. 396 (1889). 
 142. Id. at 411. 
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defendant failed to pay the plaintiff, the plaintiff sued to recover the payment.143  
The Court found that the statute in question explicitly provided that the contract 
was “null and void.”144  Distinguishing between malum in se and malum 
prohibitum, the Court refused to enforce the contract because “there can be no 
legal remedy for which is itself illegal,” and doing so would have helped the 
plaintiff to “obtain the fruits of an unlawful bargain.”145 
Non-enforcement in this situation leaves the plaintiffs without any relief.  This 
can deter the plaintiffs from engaging in illegal transactions in the future.  
However, denying relief in these situations carries a price.  The windfall retained 
by defendants may also create incentives to engage in more illegal activities or 
opportunistic behavior.146  It places a constraint upon private parties’ freedom 
of contract.  In addition, it potentially results in the forfeiture of property.147  For 
example, in Gibbs, the plaintiff was not compensated for his services.148  
Nonetheless, the courts deem non-enforcement the lesser evil because the 
plaintiffs in these cases are seeking the courts’ assistance in advancing illegal 
agreements.149  Aiding a plaintiff in his or her violation of the law would 
undermine the legitimacy of the law and the court.150 
ii.  Scenario Two: To Avoid Incentives to Engage in Fraud and 
Corruption. 
The Court in the following case avoided the greater evil of encouraging fraud 
and corruption by refusing to enforce the illegal agreement.  In Bartle v. Nutt,151 
the parties disputed a settlement of accounts involving an agreement with a 
                                                 
 143. Id. at 403. 
 144. Id. at 411‒12. 
 145. Id. at 412 (quoting Russell v. De Grand, 15 Mass. 35, 39 (1818)). 
 146. See supra Part III.A.6. 
 147. See Gibbs, 130 U.S. at 411. 
 148. Id. at 403‒04. 
 149. See supra text accompanying notes 146‒47. 
 150. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 81‒82 (1982) (refusing to enforce 
an agreement on the grounds that to hold otherwise would foster conduct that the antitrust laws 
specifically forbade); Awotin v. Atlas Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi., 295 U.S. 209, 214 (1935) (refusing 
to enforce an agreement between the bank and the customer where the bank agreed to repurchase 
accrued bonds at par upon maturity, violating a state statute deemed to protect against perilous 
outcomes in the interest of depositors and the public); Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 
439, 443‒45, 448‒49 (1872) (refusing to enforce a promissory note where the only consideration 
for the note was war bonds issued by the confederate states for the purpose of supporting the war 
against the federal government during the Civil War and noting that the Court’s authority came 
from the Constitution and it could never enforce a contract that would aid or impair the supremacy 
of the Constitution); Patton v. Nicholson, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 204, 207 (1818) (refusing to enforce 
a contract where an American citizen issued an illegal license, or pass, from the enemy to be used 
on board an American vessel during the War of 1812). 
 151. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 184 (1830). 
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public officer who engaged in fraud.152  One partner sued the other partner “to 
account for and to pay . . . one-half of [the] loss sustained by an unsuccessful 
attempt to impose spurious vouchers on the government.”153  The Court 
commented that “a judicial tribunal will degrade itself by an exertion of its 
powers, by shifting the loss from the one to the other; or to equalise [sic] the 
benefits or bur[d]ens which may have resulted by the violation of every principle 
of morals and of laws.”154 
The non-enforcement remedy arguably impaired the parties’ freedom of 
contract.  In addition, it encouraged opportunistic behavior because defendants 
in these types of cases retained a windfall as a result of the courts’ refusal to 
enforce the agreements.  The Court apparently made its choice based on a 
concern of aiding or facilitating any transactions that would encourage fraud or 
corruption.155 
iii.  Scenario Three: To Avoid Undermining Other Important Public 
Interests 
In this category, the Court refused to enforce attempted contractual waivers 
for public policy reasons.  In doing so, the Court avoided the greater evil of 
allowing private parties to override legislative intent to protect public safety.156 
For example, in R.R. Co. v. Lockwood,157 the Court struck down a contractual 
provision attempting to exempt the railroad company from its own 
negligence.158  Injured while traveling on a stock train, Lockwood sued the New 
                                                 
 152. Id. at 184‒85. 
 153. Id. at 185, 188. 
 154. Id. at 189; See also McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 640–44, 669 (1899) (refusing 
to enforce an agreement to share in profits generated from public works construction where the 
parties engaged in fraud in the bidding process to obtain the projects); Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 
U.S. 261, 271‒72 (1880) (refusing to enforce an agreement where defendant agreed to pay sales 
commission to the Turkish government in return for plaintiff’s influence over an agent of the 
Turkish government).  The Oscanyan Court noted: 
The contract was a corrupt one, [] corrupt in its origin and corrupting in its tendencies, 
the services stipulated and rendered were prohibited by considerations of morality and 
policy which should prevail at all times and in all countries, and without which fidelity 
to public trusts would be a matter of bargain and sale, and not of duty. 
Id. 
 155. See, e.g., Oscanyan, 103 U.S. at 273 (commenting that “[p]ersonal influence to be 
exercised over an officer of government in the procurement of contracts . . . is not a vendible article 
in our system of laws and morals”). 
 156. See, e.g., United States v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236, 239 (1952); Adams Express 
Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 509–12 (1913); Hart v. Pa. R.R. Co., 112 U.S. 331, 338, 340–41 
(1884); Bank of Ky. v. Adams Express Co., 93 U.S. 174, 181, 183 (1876); R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 359‒60 (1873). 
 157. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873). 
 158. Id. at 383‒84. 
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York Central Railroad Company seeking damages resulting from his injury.159  
The railroad company asserted the contractual waiver as a defense.160 
The Court upheld the trial judge’s decision to strike down the waiver.161  In 
supporting its decision, the Court commented that the fundamental principles of 
common carrier, such as a railroad company, law were “to secure the utmost 
care and diligence in the performance of their important duties—an object 
essential to the welfare of every civilized community.”162  The Court explicitly 
dismissed the defense that non-enforcement would intrude on the private right 
to contract, concluding that if a common carrier were at liberty to waive those 
“essential duties,” it would subvert “the very object of the law.”163 
b.  The Enforcement Remedy as the Lesser Evil 
Courts’ focus on the consequences of their choices has led to the enforcement 
of illegal agreements in many cases, sometimes explicitly and sometimes as a 
matter of fact.164  In the following scenarios, the Court weighed the adverse 
consequences of its choices, and chose to enforce the agreements despite the 
illegality. 
i.  Scenario One: To Avoid Fraud 
In this scenario, the Court chose to enforce illegal agreements to avoid 
encouraging fraud.  In Bein v. Heath,165 Richard Bein and his wife, Mary Bein, 
sued “to enjoin proceedings under a writ of seizure and sale . . . by the appellee, 
Mary Heath, to sell . . . [Mary Bein’s] property” that she had given to secure two 
notes drawn by her in favor of her husband.166  The plaintiffs alleged that these 
notes “were given for a loan obtained by Richard Bein, the husband, for his own 
use” and that under the Louisiana laws at that time, “the mortgage of the wife, 
and her promise to pay [his] debt, or to make her property responsible, [was] not 
binding, but void.”167 
The Court enforced the mortgage despite the agreement’s illegality under state 
law.168  Supporting its decision, the Court noted that Mrs. Bein regularly paid 
the interest for the loan, “the house and lot were insured, and the policy [was] 
annually assigned for the benefit” of Mary Health.169  These facts showed that 
                                                 
 159. Id. at 359. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 384. 
 162. Id. at 377. 
 163. Id. at 378, 379‒81. 
 164. See infra Parts III.B.2.b.i–iv. 
 165. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228 (1848). 
 166. Id. at 239. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 241, 248. 
 169. Id. at 247. 
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the plaintiff deliberately committed fraud.170  Accordingly, it can be inferred that 
the Court’s decision was based on concern that non-enforcement would “enable 
the wife to practise [sic] the grossest frauds with impunity.”171 
ii. Scenario Two: To Avoid the “Grossest Injustice” 
In the following situation, the Supreme Court chose to enforce an agreement 
despite its illegality because the plaintiff had no choice due to circumstances 
beyond his control. 
In Thorington v. Smith,172 the plaintiff, Thorington, sold a parcel of land 
situated in Montgomery, Alabama, to the defendant for $45,000.173  The 
defendant paid for most of the purchase with Confederate notes and a promissory 
note for the remaining balance.174  While the Court’s review commenced after 
the conclusion of the Civil War, the agreement was made in a Southern state 
during the life of the Confederacy.175  Federal notes of the United States were 
not in circulation in Alabama at that time, nor were silver and gold coins.176  The 
only common currency available for business transactions was treasury notes 
issued by the Confederacy, which became useless upon the conclusion of the 
Civil War.177  Thorington, the seller, sued to enforce a vendor’s lien upon the 
land sold, requesting the balance of the stipulated purchase-money in U.S. 
currency.178  Smith, the buyer, argued on the grounds that the agreement was to 
pay in Confederate notes, which were illegal under U.S. law, so U.S. courts 
could not grant relief.179 
The Court held that the agreement was in fact enforceable because the notes 
were used in “the business transactions of many millions of people” and 
represented “transactions in the ordinary course of civil society.”180  Justice 
Miller later explained his reluctant enforcement of the agreement in Thorington, 
describing the ruling as “necessary . . . to prevent the grossest injustice in 
reference to transactions of millions of people for several years in duration.”181 
                                                 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. 75 U.S. (5 Wall.) 1 (1868). 
 173. Id. at 1‒2. 
 174. Id. at 2‒3. 
 175. Id. at 1. 
 176. Id. at 1‒2. 
 177. Id. at 2. 
 178. Id. at 2‒3. 
 179. Id. at 4‒5. 
 180. Id. at 11‒12. 
 181. Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 439, 449 (1872). 
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iii.  Scenario Three: To Avoid the Twin Evils of Forfeiture of Property 
and Opportunism 
In the following line of cases, courts chose to enforce agreements despite their 
illegality to avoid encouraging illegal and opportunistic behavior and the forced 
forfeiture of property. 
In Kelly v. Kosuga,182 a seller of onions sued his buyer for failure to pay for 
the full purchase price.183  The buyer asserted the illegality defense, alleging that 
the seller was part of the illegal trust.184  The lower court granted the seller’s 
motion to strike the illegality defense.185  On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld the lower court’s decision.186  Justice Brennan justified the enforcement 
remedy because the transaction was a “completed sale of onions at a fair price” 
and giving the sale full legal effect would not result in the Court’s enforcement 
of an act in violation of the law.187  The Court commented that as long as the 
Court itself would not be enforcing the precise conduct made unlawful by law, 
the courts should follow the overriding general policy “of preventing people 
from getting other people’s property for nothing when they purport to be buying 
it.”188 
In Gates v. River Construction Co.,189 plaintiff employee sued his employer 
for unpaid wages.190  The employment agreement was to induce an alien to enter 
the United States without the requisite governmental approval in violation of 
federal immigration laws.191  Defendant employer asserted illegality as a 
defense.192  The trial court found in favor of the employer.193 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the lower court’s 
decision.194  The court commented that allowing the employer, who knowingly 
participated in and promoted an illegal transaction, to profit at the expense of the 
                                                 
 182. 358 U.S. 516 (1959). 
 183. Id. at 516. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 517. 
 186. Id. at 521. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 520‒21 (quoting Cont’l Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 
271 (1908); see also D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165, 172‒73, 178 
(1915) (enforcing a purchase and sale agreement despite the fact that the seller was part of an illegal 
trust); Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 79, 85‒86 (1851) (enforcing a contract for a sale of 
slaves even though the agreement violated the law, and pointing out that the defendant buyer was 
aware of the violation of the law and was “seeking to add to his breach of the law the injustice of 
retaining the negroes without paying for them”). 
 189. 515 P.2d 1020 (Alaska 1973). 
 190. Id. at 1021. 
 191. Id. at 1020‒21. 
 192. Id. at 1021. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 1024. 
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employee would be “a harsh and undesirable consequence of the doctrine that 
illegal contracts are not to be enforced.”195  The court noted that applying the 
non-enforcement rule would encourage employers to engage in the very same 
conduct sought to be prevented if employers could “knowingly employ 
excludable aliens and then, with impunity, to refuse to pay them for their 
services.”196 
By choosing to enforce the agreements, courts avoid the greater evil of 
forfeiture of property and opportunistic behavior even though granting relief 
effectively sanctioned plaintiffs’ violation of the law.197  Between a “clever 
scoundrel” and a regular criminal, courts seem to have decided to tolerate a 
regular criminal as the lesser evil.198 
iv.  Scenario Four: To Avoid Undermining the Law 
This scenario exemplifies the Supreme Court’s enforcement of an illegal 
agreement because employing the non-enforcement doctrine would have in fact 
undermined the purpose of the law violated by the agreement.  For example, in 
A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp.,199 the plaintiff buyer sued 
defendant seller for breaching an option agreement to purchase defendant’s 
treasury stock in exchange for money received by defendant from proceeds of a 
previous sale of treasury stock.200  Defendant denied liability upon the ground, 
inter alia, that the agreement violated a securities law, requiring the treasury 
stock of the defendant corporation to be registered for sale.201  Defendant alleged 
that it did not register the stocks in dispute prior to its sale to the plaintiff—a 
fact, alleged by defendant, known by the plaintiff to have rendered the 
transaction illegal.202 
Despite the illegality of the agreement, the Supreme Court enforced the 
agreement because the violated statute was designed to protect investors by 
requiring publication of certain information concerning securities before 
                                                 
 195. Id. at 1022. 
 196. Id. 
 197. In some cases, courts allowed recovery under quasi-contractual principles such as unjust 
enrichment.  See supra Part III.B.2.  However, recovery under quasi-contractual theories in those 
cases sometimes amount to full enforcement of the illegal agreement depending on the types of 
agreements.  See supra Part III.B.3.  For example, if a plaintiff is seeking to recover the purchase 
price of a sales agreement, awarding said plaintiff the purchase price under unjust enrichment or 
restitution, thereby enforcing the agreement, will in fact accomplish the same result.  The difference 
is mostly semantic. 
 198. Harvard Note 1913, supra note 58, 740 (commenting that “[t]he reluctance of the courts 
to adjust the rights of criminals is hardly a sufficient reason for allowing clever scoundrels to 
defraud their victims whenever they can involve them in crime”). 
 199. 312 U.S. 38 (1941). 
 200. Id. at 39. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
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offering them for sale.203  The Court found that refusing to enforce the agreement 
would have actually hindered the purpose of the securities law.204 
c.  Allowing Recovery Despite Illegality as the Lesser Evil 
In some cases, courts have allowed recovery even though the agreement was 
illegal and not enforceable.  Under this scenario, courts have rested their choices 
on quasi-contractual theories such as restitution, rescission, and unjust 
enrichment.  Recovery in these situations is aimed at avoiding particularized, 
case specific, greater evils. 
i.  Scenario One: To Avoid Fraud 
In Brooks v. Martin,205 plaintiff Martin and defendant Brooks formed a 
partnership primarily aimed at purchasing land warrants, prior to their issuance, 
from soldiers pledged to them under a law passed by Congress.206  The statute, 
in order to protect soldiers against malevolent land brokers and others who 
would take advantage of returning soldiers, prohibited any sale or agreement 
related to those warrants which have not been issued.207  There was no dispute 
that the partnership was illegal.208 
After Martin sold Brooks his interest in the partnership for a small amount, 
Martin realized that Brooks had concealed from him the true financial status of 
the partnership and sued to set aside the sale of his partnership interest, and for 
an accounting and division of the illegal partnership profits.209  Brooks had in 
his possession lands, money, notes, mortgages, and the profits of the partnership, 
all of which comprised of the original capital advanced by Martin.210  Brooks 
asserted, inter alia, illegality of the partnership business as a defense.211 
The Court, finding Brooks to have obtained possession and control of the 
proceeds by hiding the true financial status of the partnership, rejected the 
illegality defense and granted the relief that Martin requested.212  The Court, 
                                                 
 203. Id. at 42‒43 
 204. Id. at 43; see also CORBIN, supra note 1, at § 1540, at 833 (“If a bargain is illegal, not 
because a performance promised under it is an illegal performance, but only because the party 
promising it is forbidden by statute or ordinance to do so, the prohibition is aimed at that party only 
and he is the only wrongdoer.”); Kostritsky, supra note 9, at 156 (discussing the protected class 
doctrine). 
 205. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 70 (1864). 
 206. Id. at 71. 
 207. Id. at 72, 73‒75. 
 208. Id. at 79. 
 209. Id. at 70‒71, 82. 
 210. Id. at 70‒71, 81. 
 211. Id. at 70. 
 212. Id. at 80. 
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noting the completion of the illegal transaction, ostensibly based its decision 
upon finding a fraudulent breach of a fiduciary duty Brooks’ owed to Martin.213 
Reading between the lines, one senses that the Court was clearly concerned 
about fairness, i.e., it would have been unfair if Martin were denied relief.214  In 
addition, if the Court were to deny Martin relief, it would have permitted Brooks 
to retain the profits generated from the illegal partnership.215  Even though 
granting the relief sanctioned the illegal partnership and amounted to full judicial 
enforcement of an illegal agreement, the Court avoided the greater evil of 
rewarding fraud and forfeiting property.216 
ii.  Scenario Two: To Avoid Opportunistic Behavior and Forfeiture of 
Property 
In this scenario, courts have justified recovery under quasi-contractual 
theories, aimed at deterring illegal conduct and to avoid the twin evils of 
forfeiture and opportunism. 
In Nizamuddowlah v. Bengal Cabaret, Inc.,217 the plaintiff sued to recover 
payment for work completed despite relevant immigration laws forbidding his 
employment.218  The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, considered 
the existing policy dilemma—a plaintiff who knowingly violated U.S. 
immigration laws seeking redress, and an equally culpable defendant who 
manipulated illegal immigrants to work for him.219  The court reluctantly 
concluded that the only equitable option was to allow recovery under a quasi-
contractual claim of unjust enrichment,220 believing that to deny plaintiff’s relief 
                                                 
 213. Id. at 87. 
 214. Id. at 80 (finding it “difficult to perceive how the statute, enacted for the benefit of the 
soldier, is to be rendered any more effective by leaving all [profits] in the hands of Brooks, instead 
of requiring him to execute justice as between himself and his partner”). 
 215. See id. at 78‒79, 86 (noting that Martin advanced the money for the purchase of the land 
warrants, and that his “share of the profits were $30,000, for which Brooks gave him substantially 
nothing”). 
 216. See id. at 82‒83; see also Fellner v. Marino, 158 N.Y.S.2d 24, 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956) 
(allowing plaintiff to recover the money paid under an illegal contract despite the plaintiff’s 
knowledge of illegality).  The Fellner court commented: “Let it once be known that a fraud doer 
can escape the consequences of his fraud by insinuating into his remarks to the defrauded person 
some vague element of ultimate illegality, there would be no way in which to protect defrauded 
persons.”  Id.  See also Duval v. Wellman, 124 N.Y. 156, 163 (1891) (commenting that “[t]o decide 
that money could not be recovered back would be to establish the rules by which the defendant and 
others of the same ilk could ply their trade and secure themselves in the fruits of their illegal 
transactions”). 
 217. 399 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1977). 
 218. Id. at 855. 
 219. Id. at 856. 
 220. Id. at 857. 
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would encourage the defendant, and others, to engage in the same illegal 
conduct.221 
The grant of recovery in the above scenario, as exemplified in 
Nizamuddowlah, effectively rewards plaintiffs who also present themselves to 
court with unclean hands.  Even though the Nizamuddowlah court allowed 
recovery under a claim of unjust enrichment and recovery essentially enforced 
the illegal employment agreement, by allowing recovery the court avoided the 
greater evil of encouraging opportunistic behavior and accompanying forfeiture 
of property.222 
d.  Denying Recovery as the Lesser Evil 
In some cases, courts denied recovery where plaintiffs sought a return of 
money paid under an illegal agreement.223  Denying recovery in those cases 
allows courts to deter illegal behavior, opportunistic behavior, and to avoid 
forfeiture of property. 
i.  Scenario One: To Avoid Aiding Corruption 
In Sinnair v. Le Roy,224 defendant, in exchange for $450, promised to procure 
a beer license for plaintiff or return the money.225  When defendant was unable 
to obtain the license and refused to return the money, plaintiff sued to recover 
the money.226  The lower court allowed recovery of the money.227  On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of Washington reversed.228 The court noted that evidence 
presented “contains the germ of possible corruption,” and the “parties 
contemplated the use of means other than legal to accomplish the end 
desired.”229  Accordingly, the court was unwilling to “aid in the furtherance of 
an illegal transaction.”230 
                                                 
 221. See id.; see also McCauley v. Michael, 256 N.W.2d 491, 501 (Minn. 1977) (denying 
enforcement of an illegal agreement, but allowing recovery of $500 paid to purchase shares of 
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 222. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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where plaintiffs sought to enforce the terms of illegal agreements. 
 224. 270 P.2d 800 (Wash. 1954). 
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 230. Id. 
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ii.  Scenario Two: To Avoid the Twin Evils of Property Forfeiture and 
Opportunism 
In Arcidi v. National Association of Government Employees,231 the plaintiff 
entered into a consulting agreement with the defendant.232  Under the agreement, 
plaintiff, in exchange for $250,000, agreed to “secure the approval of a proposed 
real estate development by” a governmental agency.233  The transacted 
agreement was illegal, however, because compensation conditioned upon a 
pending governmental decision violated state law.234 
Subsequent to the approval of the project, defendant paid plaintiff $200,000, 
but refused to pay the remaining $50,000 balance.235  When the plaintiff sued 
the defendant to recover the remaining $50,000, the defendant asserted the 
illegality defense against enforcement and counterclaimed seeking to recover the 
$200,000 already paid.236 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, accepting 
the defendant’s illegality defense argument and ordered the plaintiff to return 
the $200,000 paid.237  The decision for both issues, the illegality defense and the 
counterclaim, was affirmed on appeal.238 
Upon review by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the court upheld the 
illegality defense, denying plaintiff relief related to the remaining $50,000 
payment.239  However, the court reversed the lower courts’ decision with respect 
to defendant’s counterclaim, finding that public interest weighed against 
granting defendant’s relief, and no other equitable consideration justified 
allowing the defendant to recover the $200,000 already paid to the plaintiff.240  
If the court were to return to the defendant funds previously paid, it would have 
resulted in the compulsory forfeiture of the value bestowed upon defendant by 
plaintiff’s consulting services, creating a windfall for the defendant.  By denying 
                                                 
 231. 856 N.E. 2d 167 (Mass. 2006). 
 232. Id. at 169. 
 233. Id. 
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 235. Id. at 171. 
 236. Id. at 169. 
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 240. Id.  The Arcidi court’s application of the non-enforcement rule has the same effect as the 
cases where courts enforced an illegal agreement or allowed recovery in favor of a party who sought 
payment for services or goods under the illegal agreement.  Ironically, the two apparently 
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with the application of the lesser evil standard. 
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recovery under these circumstances, the court avoided the greater twin evils of 
forfeiture of property and opportunism.241 
IV.  REASONS FOR THE EXPLICIT ADOPTION OF THE LESSER EVIL PRINCIPLE 
The current rule of non-enforcement, and its corresponding factually distinct 
exceptions, fails to adequately provide any clarity in this important area of 
contract law.  In this era of increasing business regulations, clarity concerning 
the underlying principle of resolving illegal agreement disputes will usher in 
greater certainty and predictability to the marketplace.242  Courts should 
explicitly adopt the lesser evil principle when adjudicating illegal agreement 
disputes for multiple reasons.  Explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle will 
provide better guidance to courts when adjudicating these difficult disputes.  It 
will lead to more consistent application of the standard, and it will not be a 
difficult task considering the courts have by and large been following the 
principle when adjudicating these cases.  Finally, a clearer standard is necessary 
because illegal agreement disputes of the future are likely to become more 
complicated due to increasing business regulations. 
A.  The Current Rules Fail to Guide Courts Adjudicating Illegality Disputes 
The current general rule of non-enforcement and its multiple exceptions have 
resulted in a confusing body of case law as illegality disputes can arise in myriad 
factual contexts.  Generally, the application of the non-enforcement rule is 
considered necessary to deter illegal transactions, but in many cases, non-
enforcement actually creates incentives to engage in more illegal or fraudulent 
conduct.243 
The current formulation imposing a general rule of non-enforcement simply 
is an inadequate tool, a blunt instrument attempting to capture a myriad of factual 
complexities utilizing only a few decrepit principles when their application is 
difficult, if not impossible, to apply. 244  As a result, these feeble principles are 
not serviceable to courts in their efforts to balance multiple competing interests.  
In fact, the current rules actually become obstacles that courts feel compelled to 
overcome in order to avoid injustice under the facts of a particular case.245 
This lack of clarity may have also led to some inconsistent rulings among 
courts.   For example, in a line of cases dealing with sales agreements that 
                                                 
 241. See id. at 173 (noting that adopting defendant’s position would make it too easy “for 
organizations to reap the benefits of illegal contracts when it is convenient, while deflecting the 
consequences onto agents and third parties when it is not”). 
 242. Miller, supra note 9 at 1496. 
 243. See supra Part III.B.2.a.ii. 
 244. See Badawi, supra note 19, at 487; see also Harvard Note 1913, supra note 58, at 739‒40 
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 245. Harvard Note 1913, supra note 58 at 739‒40. 
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violated antitrust laws, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed itself twice within 
thirteen years.246  Initially, in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.,247 the Court 
enforced a sales agreement despite the plaintiff seller’s role in an illegal trust.248  
Seven years later, in Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co.,249 
arising out of an almost identical fact pattern, the Court reversed its position and 
refused to enforce a sales agreement in favor of the plaintiff seller.250  Six years 
after Continental Wall Paper, the Court changed its mind yet again in DR Wilder 
Manufacturing Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co.,251 unanimously ordering the 
enforcement of a sales agreement despite its violation of antitrust laws.252 
One may wonder whether this change of heart would have occurred had the 
Continental Wall Paper Court focused on looking for the choice that caused the 
lesser evil.  Justice Holmes, joined by three other dissenting justices, opined that 
“the policy of not furthering the purposes of the trust is less important than the 
policy of preventing people from getting other people’s property for nothing 
when they purport to be buying it.”253  Justice Holmes’ dissent in essence 
suggests that enforcing the agreement would have been the lesser evil in that 
case.  Had the lesser evil principle been explicitly recognized, the majority may 
have enforced the agreement despite its illegality (as it did six years later). 
B.  The Lesser Evil Principle Will Help Courts Focus Their Analyses and Lead 
to More Certainty and Predictability 
The strength of the lesser evil principle is its acceptance of the complexities 
giving rise to a particular dispute.254  Instead of trying to fashion a standard for 
each case, an impossible task, the principle directs courts to focus on what is 
really at stake—the consequences of their decisions.  While explicitly adopting 
the principle will not render these disputes any easier to adjudicate,255 it will 
allow courts to better focus their analyses on their task at hand—resolving 
                                                 
 246. See cases cited infra notes 247‒52 and accompanying text. 
 247. 184 U.S. 540 (1902). 
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disputes in a way that minimizes damage to important public interests.256  
Further, explicitly adopting the lesser evil principle relieves courts of having to 
explain their way around the general rule of non-enforcement by creating 
numerous exceptions called for by the facts of the particular cases.257 
Explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle will not be difficult.  As the above 
scenarios suggest, despite several courts’ attempts to ground their reasoning in 
the existing rules and their associated exceptions, the courts were typically 
guided by the invisible presence of the lesser evil principle.258 
Additionally, explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle will eventually lead 
to more predictability and certainty in the marketplace. 259  Moreover, these 
issues can increase transaction costs if parties have to expend resources to 
contract around the rules.260  Finally, a lack of certainty with respect to illegal 
transaction adjudications can also result in over deterring innovative business 
transactions and under deterring illegal transactions.261 
Therefore, explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle is urgently needed 
these days.  The easy cases, which gave rise to the non-enforcement remedy 
historically, are increasingly less likely to occur because of potential sanctions 
imposed by criminal law.262  Businesses now face a greater number of 
regulations over commercial transactions.263  Under the current state of affairs, 
“failure to comply with the relevant provision risks a finding that the whole 
transaction is illegal” and therefore unenforceable.264  In addition, the prevalence 
of business regulations means that the issues are likely going to become 
increasingly complicated, and will likely result in these difficult cases arriving 
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before the courts in a greater frequency.265  Therefore, a clear standard guiding 
these courts will better help minimize uncertainty in the marketplace. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Courts must wrestle with competing interests when adjudicating illegal 
agreement disputes.  While the general rule of non-enforcement is appealing, it 
is deceptively over-simplistic.  Case review shows that courts have not applied 
the rule rigidly, and rightfully so.266  Instead, courts have developed multiple 
exceptions to allow greater flexibility in order to adapt to different factual 
scenarios.267  This flexibility allows courts to grant or deny relief depending on 
the facts of each case, but it also creates a confusing body of law that defies a 
coherent theory. 
Courts’ choices of remedies have so far been primarily explained and 
understood in terms of a general rule of non-enforcement, with multiple 
exceptions and exceptions within exceptions.268  Except for a few scholarly 
attempts to make sense of the case law,269 there appears to be no unifying 
principle.  However, close examination of the case law shows the guiding 
presence of the lesser evil principle, albeit implicitly. 
This article advocates an explicit adoption of the lesser evil principle in 
adjudicating illegal agreement disputes.  The principle provides better guidance 
to courts than the current hodgepodge of rules with exceptions.  It helps courts 
focus their analyses on the consequences of their choices, allowing a refinement 
of the standards when applying the principle, and encouraging more consistent 
application of the principle. 
Finally, explicit adoption of the principle will offer better guidance to 
practitioners when advising clients on these issues. 
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